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CANADIAN MILITARY HISTORY
BOOK REVIEW
SUPPLEMENT
    Autumn 1998 Issue 8
James Chace, Acheson: The
Secretary of State who Created
the American World (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1998), $42.00,
512 pages, ISBN 0-684-80843-9.
David S. Landes, The Wealth and
Poverty of Nations: Why Some
Are So Rich and Some So Poor
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,
1998), $39.99, 650 pages, ISBN 0-
393-0417-8.
Leon V. Sigal, Disarming
Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy
with North Korea (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998),
$29.95 US, 321 pages, ISBN 0-691-
05797-4.
The Lionel Gelber Prize, one ofthe world’s richest literary
prizes, awards $50,000 annually to
the year’s best book in the field of
international relations. It seeks to
widen the readership for important
works pertaining to global issues,
and to generate enlightened
discussion and debate on foreign
affairs. Among the past winners of
the prize are Donovan Webster
(Aftermath: The Remnants of War),
Eric Hobsbawm (Age of Extremes:
The Short Twentieth Century),
Michael Ignatieff (Blood and
Belonging: Journeys Into the New
Nationalism), and David
McCullough (Truman).
Three of this year’s five short-
listed books deal directly with
military matters, and run the gamut
from classic political biography to
more theoretical and polemical
treatises. Chace’s biography of Dean
Acheson, American Secretary of
State from 1949 to 1953, is the
former, in the mould of
McCullough’s prize -winning
biography of Harry Truman. Chace
notes that Acheson’s policies played
a large part in winning the Cold
War, but argues that he was not
himself a Cold Warrior at first. On
the contrary, he recognized the
validity of Soviet concerns about its
security and only hardened his
attitude when Soviet demands
threatened Turkey. At the same
time, Acheson was not a fan of
Chiang Kai-shek and his
Nationalists on Taiwan and hoped
that the United States would
recognize the Communist regime of
Mao Tse-tung. The outbreak of the
Korean War, however, altered his
views of Communist China. He was
one of the few in Washington to
defend Alger Hiss when he was
accused of being a Communist, and
became a favourite target of the
McCarthyites, who maintained that
Acheson was responsible for
“losing” China and for sabotaging
General Douglas MacArthur’s
operations in Korea.
David Landes, author of the
classic history of technology, The
Unbound Prometheus, here retells
the story of Western Civilization to
explain “why some nations are so
rich and some so poor.” Landes
shows (a) how the West developed
a spirit of enterprise and (b) how
prosperity and power are fleeting.
The states that fostered enterprise
gained wealth and power (as did
Japan), while the others fell by the
wayside. Spain fell because it failed
to invest in its own economy, buying
whatever it needed with American
gold and silver; England because
it failed to reinvest in research and
development. But Holland
rebounded on the wave of the
Second Industrial Revolution
(electrical technology) after being
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edged aside by England in the
seventeenth century. In global terms
Landes’ concern is with the Western
wannabes. China saw a powerful
central state emerge due to the need
for large irrigation projects. This
state consolidated a conformist
culture that stifled individualism
and initiative, and communism
continued the pattern. So did the
Soviet Union, so that today only the
criminals know how to get things
done. The key problem areas for
Landes are the Islamic world,
where fundamentalism suffocates
enterprise while the rich elites
spend and invest abroad; and the
developed West, where complacent
democratic societies and bottom-
line-oriented corporations prefer
consumption and overseas
investment, at a cost of jobs,
technology, and industry. The
answer lies in education, research
and development, and selective
investment in key sectors; either
that,or we learn to use chopsticks
– the key to Asian technological
dominance in Landes’ view.
Sigal’s lively and engaging
volume argues that the United States
is becoming progressively more
reluctant to throw huge amounts of
resources at international trouble
spots, and so will be forced to
retreat from its tendency to act
unilaterally and instead work in
conjunction with other nations. In
some ways, he sees the North
Korean crisis (a modern-day
equivalent to the Cuban missiles
crisis) as a turning point. The
Americans were determined to use
coercion, a strategy that ultimately
failed and brought in its train a
frightening round of sabre-rattling.
The situation was only rescued by
Jimmy Carter’s personal
intervention in striking a deal with
the North Korean government
(much to the chagrin of some
American officials, who had already
steered another course). Sigal
concludes that this episode, which
proved once and for all the utility
of cooperation over coercion, must
force the United States to alter its
approach to international relations.
“The American aversion to
cooperating in order to prevent
proliferation,” he writes, “is
perverse” (254) Criminalizing
proliferation and demonizing so-
called rogue states is at best
unhelpful and at worst dangerous;
the only safe course is to work with
them to reduce the threat they pose.
The winner of the 1998 Lionel
Gelber Prize was Robert Kinloch
Massie’s Loosing the Bonds: The
United States and South Africa in
the Apartheid Years (Toronto: Nan
A. Talese / Doubleday).
JW
RK
* * * * *
Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, The
Origins of the Present Troubles
in Northern Ireland (London:
Longman [distributed in Canada by
Addison-Wesley], 1997), $33.95
paper, 204 pages, ISBN 0-582-
10073-9.
The title of this book is somewhatmisleading, for it does not
confine itself to just the origins of
the Troubles. Instead, it is a broad
survey of the conflict which focuses
on the role of the British Army from
the late 1960s up to the summer of
1996. It is a convoluted subject, but
Kennedy-Pipe handles the policy
twists and turns with aplomb. She
begins with the roots of the current
crisis which led to the initial
deployment of the British Army,
and then traces the frequently
changing strategies of the army in
Northern Ireland, which have
included peacekeeping, contain-
ment, and Ulsterization. She also
tackles some of the army’s more
controversial tactics, such as its
much debated shoot-to-kill policy
(often linked to the SAS) and the
use of “supergrasses,” or
informers. Through it all, she
argues that British military policies
have had a double-edged impact on
the situation in Northern Ireland.
Yes, they have provided an
important stabilizing peacekeeping
element, but at the same time they
have prolonged and escalated the
violence. This fact is in no small
part due to the difficult position in
which the army has been placed: as
a prisoner of policy decisions which
give soldiers very little room to
manoeuvre.
Kennedy-Pipe fully admits that
the problem in Northern Ireland
often seems insoluble, and it is not
yet clear to what degree last spring’s
referendum will clarify things. And
her conclusion to the book is not
optimistic: until the two Irish
nationalisms (Catholic and
Protestant) are reconciled, “the
British military will continue its
historic role of being both part of
the Irish problem and yet central
to the underwriting of any solution”
(180).
CT
* * * * *
Myles Dungan, Irish Voices from
the Great War (Dublin: Irish
Academic Press [distributed in
North America by International
Specialized Book Services], 1995),
$39.50 US, 219 pages, ISBN 0-
7165-2573-9.
When Corporal E. Thomas ofthe Royal Irish Dragoon
Guards fired upon a group of
Germans at Mons on 22 August
1914, it was the first shot fired in
battle by a soldier of the British
Army on the European continent for
almost a century. Over the next four
years, up to half a million Irishmen
(unionists and nationalists) joined
up, many eventually serving in one
of the three Irish divisions, or the
Irish regiments of the old Regular
Army. Sadly, two of those divisions
(the 16th, originally comprised of
nationalists, and the 36th, originally
comprised of unionists) virtually
ceased to exist during the German
spring offensive of March 1918.
They took the brunt of the assault
and were wiped out within days,
spawning a persistent but unfair
characterization of Irish troops as
fine attackers but poor defenders.
Dungan’s book, rather than
being an exhaustive record of
Ireland’s war, focuses on specific
engagements which involved the
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Irish units, like Gallipoli, Suvla
Bay, and the Somme. To do this,
he has drawn from some fine
primary source materials;
particularly notable is the 600-page
journal of Captain N.E. Drury of the
Royal Dublin Fusiliers, which
serves as the basis of a fascinating
chapter. Of course, it might be
argued that the voices of Drury and
others are not markedly different
than the voices of soldiers from
other countries, but in fact Ireland
was in a unique position: the coming
of war brought a truce between
unionists and nationalists, who had
been on the verge of civil war over
home rule. Indeed, there are echoes
of the Canadian situation in the
hopes of many Irishmen that the war
experience would allow unionists
and nationalists to bridge their
differences and reach a lasting
peace. Again just like Canada, it
was not to be, and the war became
another obstacle to accord in Irish
history. Indeed, many veterans were
targeted as spies by the IRA during
the postwar years; as Dungan
implies, the place of the veterans
in the Ireland of the 1920s would
make a fascinating study.
Dungan is a television
journalist who has written on other
aspects of Irish military history. His
occasionally sarcastic tone and
strange epithets (surely he is the
first to refer to generals as “braided
neanderthals”) are the only
weaknesses of this otherwise
compelling account.
JFV
* * * * *
Dave McIntosh, Terror in the
Starboard Seat: 41 Trips Aboard
a Mosquito (Toronto: Stoddart,
1998 [1980]), $22.95, 176 pages,
ISBN 0-7737-3089-3.
It is nearly twenty years now sinceDave McIntosh’s memoir was first
published, and it more than holds
its own against the many personal
recollections which have appeared
in print since 1980. McIntosh
brought all of his skill as a
journalist and raconteur to the
story of his operations with a
Mosquito intruder squadron, and
brought all of his frankness as well.
The title is to betaken quite literally:
McIntosh fully admits that he lived
in an almost constant state of
extreme fear while flying, and that
occasionally he found himself
paralysed with fright. This, of
course, gave great delight to his
pilot, the American-born Sid Seid,
and the passages relating Seid’s
various “line-shoots” about the
crew’s operations are some of the
funniest in the book. Nevertheless,
it was Seid’s skill as a pilot
(McIntosh, by his own admission,
was not the best navigator) that
brought the crew safely home from
41 operations.
Dave McIntosh died in 1995
after a long career as a journalist
and writer. Terror in the Starboard
Seat was not his last book, but it
is easily his best.
LF
* * * * *
Steven Weingartner, ed., A
Weekend With the Great War:
Proceedings of the Fourth Annual
Great War Interconference
Seminar (Shippensburg, PA: White
Mane Publishing, 1997), $24.95 US
paper, 296 pages, ISBN 1-57249-
068-3.
The Cantigny Military Historyseminar brought together the
Western Front Association and the
Great War Society for a weekend
of papers and discussion on a
variety of topics. The bulk of the
papers presented have been
collected here, along with
transcripts of the question-and-
answer periods which followed
each presentation. Some of the
foremost scholars of the First
World War participated, including
Paul Fussell, Tim Travers,
Desmond Morton, and Dennis
Showalter, and the range of topics
is broad and interesting: Richard
Spence on master spy Sidney
Reilly; Dale Wilson on Patton,
Eisenhower, and American armour,
Robert Cowley on the “unreal city”
of the Western Front, and Viktor
Mal’kov on Russian historiography
of the war, to name but a few. Philip
Markham’s investigation of the
death of Manfred von Richthofen is
an interesting counterpoint to
Norman Franks and Allan Bennett’s
recent book on the subject (see
Book Review Supplement #7),
while Gerard Demaison’s study of
French forts around Verdun is a
useful introduction to the
architecture of war. All in all, the
variety of essays and the quality of
the contributors makes this a most
worthwhile volume.
JFV
* * * * *
Jeffrey Dennis Stephaniuk, The
Late War: Poems by a Veteran’s
Son (privately published [available
from the author at Box 37, Norquay,
SK, SOA 2VO], 1998), $16.95
paper, 118 pages, ISBN 0-9683424-
0-X.
This volume is a product of the1997 Royal Canadian Legion
Pilgrimage of Remembrance, in
which the author participated as the
representative of Saskatchewan.
His father had served with the
Princess Louise’s Dragoon Guards
and the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, and
Stephaniuk saw the pilgrimage as a
way to understand what his father’s
generation had experienced during
the war. As he writes, poetry
seemed a good way to express that
understanding: “Through poetry I
want to convey an emotion, about
men being soldiers, about seniors
looking back in time to find
meaning in the years of their youth,
and about being a young Canadian
free to go places impossible for the
Canadian soldiers to visit in safety.”
The poetry itself can be roughly
situated in the modernist tradition;
a stanza from “Observation Point,”
one of the better poems, is
representative: “An infantryman
stumbles / and falls, a crumble of
clothes / A last word / not always
possible.” It is worth mentioning
that the poet shares a modernist
disdain for punctuation, which in
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this case makes some of the verse
rather difficult to follow.
Nevertheless, what it lacks in
skill of execution it makes up for
in depth of feeling. Stephaniuk was
obviously very moved by the
pilgrimage, and by the desire to
come to terms with his father’s past.
He is to be commended for sharing
the products of his labour with a
wider audience.
JFV
* * * * *
James C. Lovelace, The Flip Side
of the Air War (privately published
[available from the author at #203-
5770 Spring Garden Road, Halifax,
NS, B3H 4J8], 1996), $12.00 paper,
166 pages, ISBN 0-9681077-0-2.
Jim Lovelace joined the RCAF inHalifax on 17 June 1940, on his
third attempt, and became one of
the first Canadian WOp/AGs
[Wireless Operator / Air Gunner]
to serve on operations over
Europe. His memoir of his time in
and out of combat is better in its
parts than in the whole. It is a
gripping story of how a Cape
Bretoner survived two tours in
Wellingtons, those tough, two-
engined bombers. The writer
captures well the chaos of the early
days as Canada geared up for war,
and the loneliness of Canadians in
the RAF, made worse by the frosty
reception the “colonials” received
from the pukka types.
Lovelace tells some hilarious
tales about culture conflict between
Canadian airmen and British
bullies. He describes his first trip
with 103 Squadron of Bomber
Command, and his last one with
150 Squadron, when he survived
the crash of his Wimpy and won the
DFC. WOp/AGs played a vital role
in the ZOO [Zone of Operations],
standing in the astrodome directing
the pilot and the gunners when
attacked by fighters. Lovelace’s
team trained hard and worked well
together. And so they survived –
with some luck on their side.
The writer gives many revealing
insights into his colleagues and
adds some curious footnotes to the
history of the Second World War.
In the winter of 1942, Lovelace
served with 458 (RAAF) Squadron
on a supply mission to North
Africa. He returned to Britain via
West Africa, losing his clothes and
his identification papers, and
thereby disappearing from RAF
records. Lovelace ended his war
service as a squadron leader at the
RCAF Selection Board in
Bournemouth. The book has a
striking cover, but a competent
editor would have made it easier
to read. Nevertheless, it’s a hard
book to put down once you begin
reading it, offering a unique record
of a brave airman who beats the
odds of survival in Bomber
Command.
JL
* * * * *
Ronald J. Drez, ed., Voices of
D-Day: The Story of the Allied
Invasion Told by Those Who Were
There (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana
State University Press, 1994),
$24.95 US, 312 pages,ISBN 0-8071-
1902-4.
This book comes from theEisenhower Center’s D-Day
Project at the University of New
Orleans. In 1983, historians
Stephen E. Ambrose and Ronald J.
Drez began collecting interviews
from men who had landed on the
Normandy beaches. It is not an
exaggeration to say that their work
of oral history – which forms the
core of this book – has changed
forever the way we will look at 6
June 1944.
Editor Drez introduces us to
the men of D-Day in the opening
chapter; they briefly explain why they
enlisted, how they trained, and how
they steeled themselves for the
invasion. Then comes the day, and
the chapters well reflect the
invasion sequence. The airborne
troops and airmen tell their stories
first; then Drez guides his readers
across the beaches, chapter by
chapter, from Utah to Sword.
Drez provides some insightful,
though brief, commentary but he
does not interfere with the
remarkable stories the men relate.
Here is the chaos of the day, the
sounds, the horrific scenes, the
remarkable courage. Occasionally,
Drez inserts a German voice to
provide a grim perspective from the
pillboxes on shore.
As would be expected, this is
mainly an American view of D-Day.
Canadian readers may be relieved
to find a chapter on “Gold and
Juno Beaches” but it is by far the
shortest of the book. A few
Canadian interviews are supple-
mented by Ross Munro’s memoirs
and some War Diary entries from
the Royal Winnipeg Rifles.
Considering that 3rd Canadian
Infantry Division was one of six
divisions that went ashore, the
chapter smacks of tokenism.
This is still an excellent book.
It is revealing that so much material
for the film Saving Private Ryan
was gleaned from the oral history
collection that Ronald Drez helped
organize here so well. The soldier
cannot tell us everything about that
remarkable day, but he can relate
something of how ordinary men
endured that extraordinary
challenge.
GH
* * * * *
Jerry E. Strahan, Andrew Jackson
Higgins and the Boats That Won
World War II (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press,
1994), $29.95 US, 382 pages, ISBN
0-8071-1903-2.
John A. Hutchinson, Bluejacket
(New York: Vantage Press, 1995),
$29.95 US, 628 pages, ISBN 0-533-
11182-X.
With the partial exception of theGerman-Soviet front, the
Second World War was a conflict
in which command of the sea was
paramount. Even the air war in the
European and Pacific theatres could
not have been fought without the
cargo vessels and their escorts
bringing the shorter-ranged fighters
and medium bombers to their
designated combat areas (the four-
engined “heavies” could usually get
4
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there under their own power).
Above all, soldiers and marines had
to be landed on hostile shores and
their beachheads expanded through
exploitation of local command of
the sea.
While the big ships guarded the
convoys and supported the
landings, it was the multitude of
landing craft – with their flimsy
hulls of plywood and steel – which
made it possible for the Allied
armies to meet their Axis enemies
and defeat them on land. More than
anyone else, New Orleans
entrepreneur Andrew Jackson
Higgins was responsible for the
design and production of those
specialized vessels which could run
up on enemy shores and pierce the
outer walls of the German and
Japanese defences. Jerry Strahan
has performed a long overdue
service in showing us just how
important were Higgins’ boats to
ultimate victory in the war. He deals
not just with the numbers – Higgins’
factories produced more than
20,000 landing craft and PT boats
for the Allies – but also goes into
the broader themes of design and
development problems and the
political struggles over war finance
and procurement.
Andrew Jackson Higgins is
also a fine piece of business history:
Higgins’ innovations in production
techniques, his relations with his
labour force, and his problems with
company financing are treated in
detail. Sadly, by the 1950s Higgins
Industries Inc. fell victim to bad
business decisions, a lack of
customers, and uncertain financing,
and Andrew Higgins’ contribution
to the war effort was forgotten.
Strahan’s book is a worthy
memorial to someone who, as an
organizer of war production, ranks
with Henry Kaiser or Lord
Beaverbrook.
One American sailor who didn’t
ride into battle in a Higgins boat
was Radioman First Class John A.
Hutchinson. His book Bluejacket
is a lengthy, rambling memoir of
his service in the Pacific war aboard
battleships and destroyers. At over
600 pages, it could have used the
services of a strong-willed editor.
It is, nevertheless, an entertaining
personal account (incorporating
many unfamiliar paintings,
drawings, and photographs) of the
war from Guadalcanal to Okinawa,
crammed with information on the
duties and hardships of navy life
away from “officer country.”
GDK
* * * * *
Dianne Graves, A Crown of Life:
The World of John McCrae (St.
Catharines: Vanwell Publishing,
1997), $35.00, 300 pages, ISBN 1-
55068-091-9.
John McCrae is one of the mostappealing characters of early
twentieth-century Canada. A doctor,
poet, soldier, and teacher, he was
very popular in Montreal society
for his engaging personality and
great wit. It is somewhat surprising,
then, that McCrae has until now
been the subject of only two slim
and unsatisfactory biographies,
neither of which adequately covers
the life of the man. Even A Crown
of Life, admirable though it may be,
does not fully fill the gap.
Graves is adamant that her
book does not constitute a
biography of McCrae, but rather is
an attempt to place his life in the
context of its time. As a result, the
book brings in some of the other
leading characters of the era,
including Rudyard Kipling, Sir
William Osler, Stephen Leacock,
and Leo Amery, and also describes
the significant events which
unfolded during McCrae’s lifetime.
This fact does make for some less
than graceful segues (for example,
“As the Canadian winter held the
country in its customary icy grip,
across the sea in Portsmouth
dockyard, work had been
proceeding at record pace to build
the first of Admiral Jacky Fisher’s
new ships.”). Still, it is a well
researched book, written from a
wide range of McCrae’s personal
papers held in public and private
collections. Graves obviously has
deep regard for her subject, and
has done a wonderful job of
recreating the milieu in which he
moved.
Earlier biographies of John
McCrae by Sir Andrew Macphail
and John Prescott were inadequate
in a variety of ways, and Graves’
book surpasses them both in scope
and detail. Nevertheless, a full
biography of McCrae remains to be
written, one which critically
assesses his contribution to the
medical profession, his poetry, and
his work in treating wounded
soldiers.
JFV
* * * * *
Ernest F. Motton and Mary Ann
Motton, “Right On, You Got the
Elbow Out!”: Wartime Memories
of the RCAF (Toronto: Natural
Heritage / Natural History, 1990),
$12.95 paper, 96 pages, ISBN 0-
920474-63-2.
There is no question that thiscould have been a very
interesting book. The late Ernest
Motton was a Radio Telephone
Operator with 143 Wing RCAF in
northwest Europe, and remained
with the occupation forces in
Germany until late 1945. These
experiences could have provided a
window into a little known but
immensely important job in the air
force. However, although there are
many good anecdotes about
Motton’s off-duty activities, there is
very little about his actual
responsibilities as an RTO. It is
never made clear exactly what an
RTO did, how his duties were
crucial in the running of the wing,
or how those duties changed after
VE-Day. Unfortunately, there are
also a lot of factual errors which
weaken the book. On a more
positive note, there are some lovely
photos and the book has very high
production values. But one is left
with the feeling that a more
knowledgeable interviewer might
have coaxed a more substantial
account out of Motton.
LF
* * * * *
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Michael R. Gordon and General
Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’
War: The Inside Story of the
Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1995),
$36.95, 551 pages, ISBN 0-316-
32172-9).
This account of the 1990-91 GulfWar should be required reading
for all students of contemporary
warfare. Relying heavily on
interviews with senior officials, it
examines in detail the personalities,
structures, and doctrines that led
to Coalition victory, especially the
conduct of military operations by
H. Norman Schwarzkopf ’s United
States Central Command
(CENTCOM). The authors concede
the obvious, that Operation Desert
Storm was a resounding success,
but they qualify it in important ways.
It is not mere carping. The
Generals’ War makes a convincing
case that there were serious
problems on the allied side. One
was the difficulty of coordinating
multiple military planning cells in
Saudi Arabia and the United States,
many of which acted as de facto
command staffs for senior officials.
Another was Schwarzkopf ’s
tendency to let subordinates plan
their operations more or less
independently. A third was the
allies’ failure to establish clear
objectives for the cessation of
hostilities. US officials were
adamant early in the war that the
destruction of Iraq’s elite
Republican Guard was the
offensive’s primary military
objective, but bomb damage
assessment was ambiguous enough
for commanders, intelligence
agencies, and politicians to draw
different conclusions. While
analysts pored over the data, more
than half the Republican Guard
skipped over the Euphrates to fight
another day.
CENTCOM’s greatest military
error was permitting the Marine
divisions opposite Kuwait to attack
before the Army’s VII and XVIII
Corps launched their sweeping
offensive in the west, an unfortunate
result, the authors contend, of
Schwarzkopf ’s deliberately loose
style of leadership. Rather than
fixing the Iraqis in Kuwait, as
CENTCOM had intended, the
Marines routed the badly mauled
Iraqis, driving them north and out
of the envelopment area before the
encircling left hook had even
commenced. Schwarzkopf moved
up the Army’s start time, but the
fleeing Iraqis had a valuable head
start and the Army’s senior generals
were not sufficiently aggressive to
make up for lost time. The
retreating Iraqi formations might
still have been caught if television
images of the “Highway of Death”
had not created the impression that
the victorious Allies were “piling
on,” in the words of Colin Powell,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
Almost immediately, pressure built
in Washington for a quick, clean
end to the fighting so the Army’s
final push never materialized. As
Coalition guns fell silent, thousands
of Iraqi troops and hundreds of
armoured vehicles streamed north
across their front. Within days,
they were busy pounding anti-
Hussein rebels, restoring the
regime George Bush once claimed
was more evil than Adolf Hitler’s.
This provocative, accessible
volume will remain a standard text
on the Gulf War for years to come.
Its emphasis on leadership,
bureaucratic politics, training, and
doctrine is a welcome corrective to
the techno-fixation that followed the
campaign. All revisionist medicine
should taste so sweet.
DFO
* * * * *
Chester E. Baker, Doughboy’s
Diary (Shippensburg, PA: Burd
Street Press, 1998), $19.95 US, 138
pages, ISBN 1-57249-100-0.
Like many Americans in 1916,Chester Baker (or Zeb, as he
was known in the army) was
motivated to enlist by Pancho
Villa’s raid into the southern
United States. On 7 July 1916,
Baker and 122 other recruits from
around Huntingdon, Pennsylvania,
entrained for El Paso, Texas, where
they spent eight months doing a
variety of menial military duties but
never once catching a glimpse of
Villa. Returning to Pennsylvania in
February 1917, they were just in
time to be shipped overseas when
the United States entered the war.
Baker’s unit, as part of the 28th
(Pennsylvania) Division, entered the
lines in July 1918 near Chateau-
Thierry and fought for the
remainder of the war, although
Baker himself missed the unit’s last
action; taken ill, first with fever and
then with the mumps, he greeted
the 11th of November from a French
hospital bed.
Baker recorded his memoirs
in 1979, at the age of 86 because he
was “obsessed with telling what I
remember of my fallen comrades.”
When he died in 1980, only two
other veterans of his company
survived him. Baker obviously had
very clear memories of the men
with whom he served; there are
many interesting characters who
emerge from the pages of this book,
and he was obviously deeply
affected by the friends he made (and
lost) during the Great War. The
book’s one weakness is the absence
of maps; one is often forced to refer
to other reference works to follow
the movements of Baker’s unit.
Still, for its battle accounts and for
its description of the problems
faced by American units as they
waited in France to be returned
home (Baker’s regiment did not
leave France until April 1919),
Doughboy’s Diary is a very good
read.
JFV
* * * * *
Greig Stewart, Arrow Through the
Heart: The Life and Times of
Crawford Gordon and the Avro
Arrow (Whitby: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1998), $29.99, 240 pages,
ISBN 0-07-560102-8.
Crawford Gordon was “a hardhitting blunt businessman” – it
is typical of Greig Stewart’s book
that the best insight into Crawford
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Gordon comes from a Saturday
Night article – who gained fame
through his wartime association
with C.D. Howe and the Avro
Arrow. Whether Gordon actually
did anything to deserve this
attention remains a mystery, even
after reading this book.
Crawford Gordon was born 26
December 1914, some two years
after his mother survived the
sinking of the Titanic and married
banker Crawford Gordon Sr. After
spending his early childhood in
Jamaica, our Crawford enrolled in
Appleby College, an elite prep
school near Toronto. He did well
in school, setting the tone for his
career: doing whatever the situation
required. In 1931 Crawford moved
to Montreal to attend McGill
University, where he majored in
Commerce and minored in
carousing with his Zeta Psi frat
brothers (which also set the tone
for his later career). In 1942
Gordon joined C.D. Howe’s team
in Ottawa, where his mentor’s
reputation as a no-nonsense
decision maker inspired him.
Gordon returned to industry
briefly, then turned to Howe again,
who appointed him to run A.V. Roe.
There “Canada’s leading
industrialist” ran the Arrow
straight into the ground, and
himself as well. Like other once-
great businessmen Gordon tried to
drink and gamble his way to the
top, and failed. He died a broken
man in New York on 26 January
1967, one month after his 52nd
birthday.
Although Greig Stewart has
written a previous book on the
Arrow, this biography of the man
who destroyed the Arrow is
remarkably thin on Gordon’s time
at A.V. Roe – although we do learn
eventually that while the Arrow was
running into problems at Malton
Gordon was drying out at Mayo.
The book is based on interviews,
letters, published speeches, and
press clippings. The result is not
so much a biography as an
extended gossip column; we learn
more about Crawford’s drinking
habits – drinking was his habit –
than about whatever made him
“Canada’s leading industrialist.”
The titbits and quotes are no
substitute for archival research on
the problems associated with A.V.
Roe and the Arrow which were
apparent long before Sputnik
preempted the maiden launch of the
Arrow on 4 October 1957. Gordon’s
presence made a difficult situation
impossible. We learn a lot about
Gordon’s difficult side in this book,
but very little on why such a difficult
man was in his position in the first
place.
JW
* * * * *
Kenneth K. Blyth, Cradle Crew,
Royal Canadian Air Force, World
War II (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower
University Press, 1997), $19.95 US
paper, 197 pages, ISBN0-89745-
217-8.
The title of this book is derivedfrom the nickname given to the
seven men who flew Halifax EQ-J
for Johnny with 408 Squadron
RCAF; because their average age
was only a little over 18 years, it
seemed an apt moniker. They flew
their first operation as a crew on
14 February 1945, when they
targetted the German industrial city
of Chemnitz; their 17th and last op
came on 31 March 1945. The
daylight raid on submarine pens at
Hamburg should have been “a piece
of cake,” according to Blyth, but
they had to switch aircraft not once
but twice because of mechanical
problems. Even their third aircraft
was experiencing mechanical
problems but Blyth elected to press
on and attempt to catch up with the
bomber stream. It was a fateful
decision. The master bomber was
just leaving the target area when
Blyth’s Halifax arrived, so they
were left in the unenviable position
of having to bomb alone. The
outcome was almost inevitable:
their aircraft had the undivided
attention of German fighters, and
shortly after closing the bomb-bay
doors the Hallie was set alight by
an Me-262. All seven crew members
escaped, only to be captured and
spend the last few weeks of the war
as POWs.
Blyth writes candidly and
lucidly of his experiences in the
RCAF. He admits that his yarns have
been embellished over time, but
they do not appear so; there is little
in the book that bears the
hallmarks of being told one too
many times. The book’s major
weakness is its organization: the
first dozen or so chapters alternate
between training and captivity, a
disorienting characteristic that
makes the early parts rather
difficult to follow. Readers would
be advised to read the even-
numbered chapters first, and then
go back to the odd-numbered
chapters! Still, it is a very
interesting memoir written from
someone who experienced the dying
days of the strategic bombing
campaign.
JFV
* * * * *
William R. Westlake, For Heroism
or Extraordinary Achievement
While Participating in Aerial
Flight: The American
Distinguished Flying Cross
Awarded to United Kingdom and
Commonwealth Forces for the
Korean War (privately published
[available from the author at 1444
West La Jolla Drive, Tempe,
Arizona, USA, 85282-4457], 1997),
$25.00 US paper, 128 pages, ISBN
0-9641533-5-1.
I n 1995, William Westlakepublished a register of the British
and Commonwealth soldiers who
were awarded the American Bronze
Star during the Korean War. Now,
he has followed up that very valuable
research guide with this directory
of recipients of the American DFC.
One hundred and ten DFCs were
awarded to British and
Commonwealth servicemen,
including 13 to Canadians (5 men
from the Canadian Army, one from
the Royal Canadian Navy, and seven
from the Royal Canadian Air Force).
Among the Canadian winners are
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such well known names as Ernie
Glover (the only Commonwealth
pilot to shoot down three MiG-15s)
and Omer Levesque (the first
Commonwealth pilot to shoot down
a MiG-15), as well as lesser known
heroes like Lieutenant Joseph J.
MacBrien, the only member of a
Commonwealth naval force to
receive the DFC, awarded for an
attack on Pukchong on 1 February
1953. Another interesting story
concerns Captain J.H. Howard of
the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery,
who was awarded the DFC on 16
February 1952 but could not
officially accept it because Canadian
regulations prevented servicemen
from accepting more than one
foreign decoration (Howard had
already been awarded the United
States’ Air Medal).
Westlake has included the
citation for each award (where
available), as well as photographs
of many of the recipients and of the
aircraft they flew. Well organized
and handsomely produced, the
book is an extremely handy
reference guide to students of the
Korean War.
DR
* * * * *
Eric Hammel, Air War Europa:
America’s Air War Against
Germany and North Africa,
1942-1945 (Pacifica, CA: Pacifica
Press, 1994), $19.95 US paper, 571
pages, ISBN 0-935553-25-8.
Eric Hammel, Air War Pacific:
America’s Air War Against Japan
in East Asia and the Pacific,
1941-1945 (Pacifica, CA: Pacifica
Press, 1998), $59.95 US, 848 pages,
ISBN 0-935553-26-6.
At last we have a set of referenceworks to place alongside the
Bomber Command War Diaries
which put any aspect of the United
States’ air war effort at one’s
fingertips. These excellent
reference books provide a day-by-
day account of aerial operations,
with each day divided into smaller
geographic areas. The detail is
sparse, but it is more than enough
to give a clear idea of the operations
undertaken. Here, for example, is
the entry for 27 July 1945:
“China: Thirteen 341st Medium
Bombardment Group B-25s and
more than 50 14th Air Force fighter-
bombers attack road, rail, and
river traffic throughout northern
French Indochina and southern and
eastern China. Chinese Army
ground forces recapture Tanchuk
Airdrome.
“East Indies: XIII Bomber
Command B-24s attack Borneo/
Pontianak Airdrome.
“Japan: More than 60 FEAF B-
24s attack marshalling yards at
Kagoshima, and their 50 P-51
escorts attack numerous targets of
opportunity in the Kagoshima area;
and more than 150 FEAF P-47s
attack bridges, a tunnel, a power
plant, and numerous industrial and
communications targets across
Kyushu. Lt. Cleveland L. Null, a VF-
16 F6F pilot, achieves ace status
when he downs three Ki-84s over
Ozuki at 0845 hours. During the
night of June 27-28, 24 504th Very
Heavy Bombardment Group B-29s
sow mines in Shimonoseki Strait,
Fukawa Bay, and off four port
cities.”
Both volumes are very user-
friendly, each having an excellent
comprehensive index (running to
well over 100 pages in the Pacific
volume) which makes it easy to find
individuals, units, air bases, and
targets. Good maps are provided,
as well as short but serviceable
bibliographies. Hammel has also
written good introductory
narratives to set the chronologies
into context.
LF
* * * * *
Frances H. Early, A World Without
War: How U.S. Feminists and
Pacifists Resisted World War I
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press, 1997), $22.95 US paper, 265
pages, ISBN 0-8156-2764-5.
Overshadowed by its more wellknown relative, the American
Civil Liberties Union, the Bureau
of Legal Advice slipped into
obscurity after 3 years of providing
assistance to conscientious
objectors, enemy aliens, socialists,
and others who were deemed to be
enemies of the American war effort.
From 1917 to 1920, the Bureau and
its leading lights, Frances
Witherspoon, Tracy Mygatt, and
Charles Recht, toiled on a shoe-
string budget and under the
watchful eye of the government to
ensure the survival of civil rights
in wartime. In this wonderfully
researched book, Early tells their
story with sympathy and grace. She
adeptly recreates both the milieu in
which they worked and the
difficulties they faced as near
pariahs in their own society, and
carefully charts their efforts to use
the checks and balances of a
democratic state to mitigate its
worst anti-democratic excesses. In
the end, she concludes that the
Bureau made a real difference, not
simply to the nascent American
peace movement but to the lives of
the men and women who came to it
for help.
Because of the quality of the
research, it is to be regretted that
Early did not engage some of the
more general questions her book
raises. For example, she accepts
Charles Recht’s glib assertion that
the First World War was “strictly a
male affair” rather than testing its
validity. Certainly there was a
gendered division of roles, but it
is difficult to argue that there were
separate male and female responses
to the war. We shall never know how
many young men were bullied into
enlisting by a pack of society
matrons brandishing white
feathers, but we do know from
contemporary literature that women
were every bit as hawkish and
bloodthirsty as men when it came
to prosecuting the war against the
Kaiser. Furthermore, Early is
entirely justified in praising these
committed idealists in fighting for
peace and freedom, but her view of
those people who held opposing
views is somewhat one-
dimensional. They certainly tended
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towards super-patriotism, but they,
too, firmly believed that they were
fighting for peace and freedom, and
to rid the world of militarism. Even
80 years after the event, it is
impossible to say which side was
misguided.
JFV
* * * * *
Paul F. Braim, The Test of Battle:
The American Expeditionary
Forces in the Meuse-Argonne
Campaign (Shippensburg, PA:
White Mane Books, 1998), $35.00
US, 247 pages, ISBN 1-57249-085-3.
Since 1918, one of the problemswhich has bedevilled military
historians is the impact of the
American entry into the war. What
role did the AEF play in the eventual
defeat of Germany? Was it really the
weight of American numbers which
finally turned the tide in the Allies’
favour? Was the Meuse-Argonne
campaign, as commanders and staff
of the AEF believed, the most
decisive campaign in the war? These
are the questions that Braim tries
to answer in this detailed and
workmanlike account which brings
a refreshing objectivity to a debate
which has seen precious little of
that.
Braim concludes that the AEF
was hampered by some serious
flaws when it went into action on
the Western Front. Communications
and artillery coordination were both
lacking. Training had been woefully
inadequate, so many doughboys
were ill-equipped to face the
modern battlefield. Leadership at
various levels was also suspect,
particularly in that Pershing
adhered to an outdated and
dangerous (at least in the context
of the Western Front) tactical
doctrine. Rather than heed the
lessons which had been painfully
learned in earlier campaigns (by the
time the AEF went into action on
the Meuse-Argonne, the Canadians
and Australians had essentially
solved the tactical conundrum of
the Western Front), AEF
commanders returned to the non-
tactic of hurling tens of thousands
of troops against heavy defences in
a narrow corridor. The results were
the same as they had been on the
Somme or at Passchendaele:
ground was gained, but only at a
terrible cost.
In the end, Braim makes a
convincing case that the Meuse-
Argonne was an important
campaign, but certainly not a
decisive one. Furthermore, he
argues that had the war continued
into 1919, then the Americans could
have claimed that their intervention
was responsible for the Allied
victory. However, the war ended
before it was possible to make that
claim. In the end, the US military
intervention was significant but it
was hardly the war-winner that
many polemicists have claimed it
was.
JFV
* * * * *
James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe:
Creating the Operational Air War,
1918-1940 (Lawrence, Kansas:
University of Kansas Press, 1997),
$39.95 US, 378 pages, ISBN 0-
7006-0836-2.
It has long been argued that theGerman Luftwaffe of the Second
World War lacked clear strategic
goals, and thus did not effectively
utilize long-range heavy bombers in
the manner of the American and
British air forces. James Corum
makes a strong case for a sharply
contrasting perspective. Strongly
researched in Luftwaffe documents
in the United States and Germany,
as well as numerous German
primary (interview) and secondary
sources, Corum offers an
extensively detailed analysis of the
ideas and practices of aerial
operational concepts as generated
and adopted by Germany’s air
force, beginning with the lessons of
Great War, through lean times as a
clandestine organization in the late
1920s (after being banned in the
Versailles Treaty), to the days as the
darling service of the Third Reich,
especially after its official
recognition as an arm of the
military in 1935. Corum strafes the
popular myths that have presented
the Luftwaffe command as inept,
countering instead, through an
analysis of their extensive training
programme, that it was both highly
trained and intelligent, manned by
veterans, staff-trained officers, and
the best of Germany’s young men.
In the interwar era, Hermann
Göring had little say in the strategic
and tactical planning of the force.
Another armour-piercing salvo
is fired through the belief that
Luftwaffe tactics were based upon
terror bombing, as “invented” by
the Condor Legion at Guernica
during the Spanish Civil War. The
number of casualties and the costs
of damage have been greatly
exaggerated. What the Spanish
experience really taught the
Luftwaffe was that bombers were
vulnerable to fighters, and that
bombing civilians actually raised
the morale of those being targeted!
Instead, the force practiced close
support and poor weather flying.
The Germans learned from
their experiences, and
experimented where contemporary
theory, such as the mass-bombing
concepts of Italian Guilio Douhet (as
adopted by the Allies), was wanting.
Despite a failure to create a strong
naval branch of the service (little is
said about big bombers), in the first
year of the Second World War “their
conception of a future air war and
the training and equipment
required for such a war was far
more accurate than their opponents’
air power vision” (287). It was not
overwhelming numbers that spelled
the early success of the Luftwaffe,
but training, planning, experience,
and the willingness to experiment
(producing innovations such as
paratroops). German bombers
failed to win the daylight encounters
of the Battle of Britain not because
the Heinkels and Junkers were at
fault, but because they lacked
suitable long-range escort. The
showing was remarkable despite
the fact that the island nation was
not even considered a target until
1938 (256), and that pilots were
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exhausted from continuous action
in Poland and the Low Countries
(283)!
In the final sweep, both the
strategy and tactics of this
controversial book are sound, well
escorted, discernable, and valuable
to novice historian and “ace”
theorist alike. Corum’s effort is
indeed a successful sortie.
SPS
* * * * *
Hubert C. Johnson, Breakthrough:
Tactics, Technology, and the
Search for Victory on the Western
Front in World War I (Novato:
Presidio, 1994), $24.95 US, 322
pages, ISBN 0-89141-505-X.
Since the late 1980s there havebeen a number of good analyses
of the war on the Western Front,
particularly in the work of Tim
Travers, who focused primarily on
high command, technology, and
tactics during the final stages of the
war. Hubert C. Johnson takes a
similar approach, but concentrates
on the entire war. While claiming
that he was unable to see Travers’
How the War was Won (1992)
before the publication of his own
book, Johnson has admirably filled
a gap in the chronology by
addressing the subject throughout
the war. Like Travers, Johnson is
not overly harsh on the high
commanders. Using a blend of First
World War official documents and
the diaries and memoirs of those
in the “sharp end,” Johnson
presents a year by year account of
tactical changes and technological
innovations. First World War tactics
can be delineated into a number of
stages: the open warfare of 1914;
stalemated trench warfare of 1915-
16 (dominated by artillery);
technological specialization and the
German perfection of defense in
1917; and the combined arms open
warfare tactics from Cambrai
(1917) to the close of the war,
including the primacy of supply to
achieve and sustain a breakthrough.
Luck, skill, technology derived
from tactical changes, arms
cooperation, enough mid-ranking
officers thinking flexibly, and other
intangibles (such as politics)
contributed to the final Allied
success in 1918. In the interwar
years only the German army
learned the lessons, while the
British re-instituted cavalry and the
French turned to a 1915 mind-set
and built the static defensive line
of Maginot. It would not bode well
for the Allies in 1939-42.
The strength the book lies in
comparative analysis of the Allies
(including the Americans) and the
Central Powers. The reader is able
to “look down” upon a battle and
see how it is fought, a luxury that a
few rickety observation craft could
not provide the high command.
Maps and photographs help to
illustrate the picture even more
clearly. A weakness of the book is
over- repetition of points, and only
a thin wiring of notations.
Nonetheless, with Travers,
Rawling, Schrieber, and others,
Johnson has brought the analysis
of tactics on the Western Front to
near completion. What is now
needed is work on the Eastern
Front, that anomaly of sustained
open warfare.
SPS
* * * * *
David Horner, General Vasey’s
War (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne
University Press [distributed in
North America by Paul & Company],
1996), $24.95 US paper, 364 pages,
ISBN 0-522-84690-4.
William B. Breuer, MacArthur’s
Undercover War: Spies,
Saboteurs, Guerrillas, and Secret
Missions (Toronto: John Wiley &
Sons, 1995), $34.95, 257 pages,
ISBN 0-571-11458-8.
Australian military history in thetwentieth century shares a
certain similarity with that of
Canada. In both World Wars,
Australian and Canadian
commanders served under British
senior officers, and their troops in
communiques and in the press were
usually subsumed in the blanket
description “British forces.” The
Aussies in World War II had another
strike against them: not only did
they have to serve under British
generals of varying quality, but they
achieved their greatest victories
under the American supremo,
Douglas MacArthur, who was
frequently suspicious about their
military competence when he wasn’t
blatantly downplaying their
achievements.
In the past few years,
Australians have been turning out
excellent biographies of the soldiers
who halted the Japanese advance
in the South-West Pacific, and
spearheaded the Allied campaigns
in New Guinea against an enemy, a
terrain, and a climate which gave
the huge island the well merited
description of “Green Hell.” While
public attention, particularly in the
United States, was fixed on the epic
naval battles and the US Marines’
ground campaign at Guadalcanal,a
largely Australian force was the first
to defeat a Japanese amphibious
landing (at Milne Bay in eastern
New Guinea), while simultaneously
turning back their attempt to
capture the key Allied base at Port
Moresby on the island’s southern
coast. The Australian counter-attack
along the Kokoda Track, and their
hard-won victories at Gona and
Sanananda, were the finest
achievement of George Vasey, one
of the best soldiers to emerge from
the Royal Military College at
Duntroon.
General Vasey’s War, written
by David Horner, the dean of
Australia’s military historians,
traces Vasey’s career from his
service as an artillery officer in
World War I, through peacetime
postings in Australia and India, to
his outstanding contributions in
World War II. Vasey distinguished
himself commanding Australian
troops in the Middle East, and in
the disastrous campaigns in Greece
and Crete, before returning to
Australia in 1941 to help organize
the defence of an almost defenceless
country. From October 1942
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onward, Vasey commanded the 7th
Division and played a leading part
in the Allied campaigns to drive the
Japanese from northern New
Guinea. By 1944, Vasey was under
consideration to replace Sir
Thomas Blamey as Commander-in-
Chief. Tragically, he died in an air
accident in Northern Queensland in
March 1944.
Horner’s biography is not a
simple “life and times.” Much of the
book is devoted to Vasey’s
correspondence with his wife, and
the letters provide us with an
unusually intimate portrait of a man
as well as a professional soldier,
someone who could maintain his
sense of proportion even when
dealing with the erratic Blamey and
the vain MacArthur (“the great white
chief ” in Vasey’s description).
General Vasey’s War is essential
reading for anyone who still thinks
that the New Guinea campaign was
MacArthur’s, Eichelberger’s or
Kenney’s. As great as the
accomplishments of these American
commanders and their soldiers and
airmen were, the fact remains that
until 1944, the majority of the
fighting troops and many of the
aircrew in the Green Hell of New
Guinea were Australians.
Apart from their role as
Coastwatchers in the Solomon
Islands and the Bismarck
Archipelago, Australians are under-
represented in William Breuer’s
MacArthur’s Undercover War, a
readable, popular account of
clandestine military operations in
the South-West Pacific and the
Philippines. The book is aimed,
naturally enough, at an American
readership and makes no attempt
at a comprehensive, balanced
account of Allied undercover
operations in the Pacific Theatre.
Readers looking for scholarly
treatments of the subject should
consult Edward J. Drea’s
MacArthur’s Ultra and Alan
Powell’s War by Stealth.
GDK
* * * * *
R. Bruce Porter with Eric Hammel,
Ace!: A Marine Night-Fighter
Pilot in World War II (Pacifica, CA:
Pacifica Press, 1995), $19.95 US
paper, 279 pages, ISBN 0-935553-
31-2.
In this fascinating memoir, Porterdescribes what must be the
ultimate terror for a pilot: landing
a heavy and high-powered fighter
aircraft on the pitching deck of an
aircraft carrier in total darkness.
“I found myself unforgivably
apprehensive for the first time in
my flying career,” he writes of his
first night launch and landing. “The
prospect of first combat had not
come as close to terrorizing me as
this flight.” Nevertheless, Porter did
his circuit, picked the dim shape
of the carrier out of the darkness,
located the controller’s coloured
paddles, and plopped the Hellcat
on the deck for a perfect landing.
Porter also introduces any
interesting irony to the story.
Despite having become an ace while
flying night Hellcats from Okinawa,
he questions the whole point of the
Marine Corps’ night-flying
programme. Porter himself trained
intensively for 14 months to learn
the craft of a night-fighter pilot, yet
all that training netted him only two
kills while on night-fighter duties;
many of his squadron pilots went
through the same training without
achieving a single aerial victory.
This lack of success had nothing to
do with the pilots’ skill; there
simply were not that many Japanese
aircraft operating at night around
the home islands. For example,
from 12 May 1945 until the end of
the war, Porter flew many night
missions but was vectored onto
enemy aircraft on only two
occasions; both times he shot down
the bogey. It is this infrequency of
contact with the enemy which
moved Porter to reconsider the
usefulness of the night-fighter
programme.
There is much more to Porter’s
story than night-fighter operations,
however. He joined the Marine
Corps in January 1940, trained on
Wildcats, and flew Corsairs in the
Solomon Islands (where he picked
up his first kills). He had a long
and varied career in the Pacific
theatre, and describes his
experiences with skill and verve.
CT
* * * * *
Robert E. Denney, Civil War
Medicine: Care and Comfort of
the Wounded (New York: Sterling
Publishing [distributed in Canada
by Canadian Manda Group], 1995),
$27.95 paper, 400 pages, ISBN 0-
8069-0880-7.
What sustains men in battle?Military historians have
suggested various responses, but
one must certainly include the
medical services in such a
discussion. In Civil War Medicine:
Care and Comfort of the
Wounded, Robert E. Denney takes
us deep into the American Civil
War. Well known battles such as
Antietam, Gettysburg, and
Sherman’s March to the Sea come
alive, but this time through the
perspective of the medical men and
women who were also present
during these now legendary events.
Denney transports the reader to a
world before antiseptics and a time
when disease killed more men than
wounds. In what is largely an
anthology of excerpts from letters,
diaries, and Reports of the US
Sanitary Commission, we learn how
the war both affected and was
affected by the medical services as
the days, months, and years
unfolded. Indeed, the book reads
much like a personal diary, with
events arranged chronologically, at
times with some dates missing.
Although it contains excerpts from
the diaries and letters of such
prominent medical figures as
Jonathan Letterman, Clara Barton,
“Mother” Mary Ann Bickerdyke,
and Louisa May Alcott, the stories
and experiences of countless other
less well known men and women
are documented as well. Civil War
Medicine: Care and Comfort of the
Wounded is not a book for the
squeamish. Graphic accounts of
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wounds abound, yet they
nonetheless remind the general
reader and the scholar of the true
horrors of war. That may be the
most important medicine of all.
AVL
* * * * *
Norman Hillmer, Robert Bothwell,
Roger Sarty, Claude Beauregard,
eds., A Country of Limitations:
Canada and the World in 1939
(Ottawa: Canadian Committee for
the History of the Second World War
[available from 22 Downing St.,
Ottawa, ON, K1S 2W1], 1996),
$15.00 paper, 295 pages, ISBN 0-
660-59970-8.
These papers, originallypresented at a conference
convened in Elora, Ontario, in
November 1989, examine a year
which the editors characterize as
“a junction, linking peace and war,
domestic and foreign, an unhappy
recent past with an uncertain
future.” The collection first lays out
the international context, and then
examines the country through
studies of the regions and the
various arms of the government.
Doug Owram and Paul Marsden
argue that, in terms of the
bureaucracy and economic
planning, Canada was ill-prepared
for the challenge that lay ahead.
Angelika Sauer turns to Mackenzie
King, interpreting his machinations
in the House of Commons in
September 1939 as “the last
triumph…of Victorian liberalism
over the modern notion of national
interest.” Roger Sarty also writes
of the Prime Minister, suggesting
that “he proved to be a more
committed proponent of military
expansion than anyone had
suspected.” The regional studies
are just as strong as these
examinations of central government
policy. Particularly interesting is
Terry Copp’s paper on Ontario on
the eve of war which contends that
there was broad public support for
a war which many people believed
was just and necessary. Despite the
fact that Copp’s position was
distinctly unpopular and
controversial at the time, his
conclusions have since been
supported by further studies.
Subsequent conferences were
convened annually, on the 50th
anniversary of each year of the
Second World War. Perhaps one
day those papers will also appear
in print.
DR
* * * * *
Carman Miller, Painting the Map
Red: Canada and the South
African War,1899-1902 (Ottawa
and Montreal: Canadian War
Museum and McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1998 [1993]),
$22.95 paper, 541 pages, ISBN 0-
7735-1750-2.
According to Carman Miller,Canada’s participation in the
South African War has been
neglected by historians. Indeed, his
book begins with a poignant
reflection from Canadian author
Margaret Atwood on the statues
from the war, wondering whether
anyone even notices them anymore.
Yet, from 1899-1902, the experience
of Canadians both at home and
abroad was bound up tightly with
the South African War.
Miller traces the experience of
the over 7000 citizen soldiers from
mobilization in Canada to their
engagements in South Africa and
eventual return home. However, he
also clears up some
misconceptions. Miller points out
that francophones were not the only
Canadians to voice opposition to the
war. Indeed, several groups in
English Canada took issue with
imperialism and the war as well.
Miller also refutes the conspiracy
theory which contends that the
Laurier government went to war
because of the actions of Lord
Minto, E.T.H. Hutton and Joseph
Chamberlain. In the end, Miller
argues, the Canadian government
“capitulated to the demands of pro-
war advocates.” Especially well
done in this book are the
descriptions of life aboard the
troop ships during the passage to
South Africa, as well as the accounts
of the unsanitary conditions in the
camps. In a war in which disease
was a greater threat to life than rifle
wounds, Miller justifiably includes
the role of the medical services.
While his descriptions of the
routines of army life are of great
interest to the general reader,
Miller’s intensely detailed battle
accounts and accompanying maps
are a battle enthusiast’s dream.
Combined with some rare
photographs of our troops at war,
Miller leaves very little to the
imagination in his comprehensive,
yet accessible account. Perhaps as
we approach the one hundred year
anniversary of the war, Canadians
will take more interest in this
nation’s other forgotten war.
AVL
* * * * *
Lieutenant-Colonel E.G. de
Domenico, Land of a Million
Elephants: Memoirs of a
Canadian Peacekeeper
(Burnstown, ON: General Store
Publishing, 1997), $18.95 paper,
131 pages, ISBN 1-896182-80-1.
Now that peacekeepingoperations have started to
occupy the interests of historians
and writers, it is high time that we
hear more from the peacekeepers
themselves. This volume fits the
bill, because it provides an excellent
personal window into one of
Canada’s earliest peacekeeping
operations. De Domenico served
with the International Commission
for Supervision and Control in
Laos, and writes frankly of the
challenges and rewards of that early
operation. He was plucked from a
job organizing the training of
militiamen in anti-aircraft artillery
in Ontario and told that he would
be shipped out to Indochina within
the month. For the next year, he was
based at a variety of locations (from
large cities like Vientiane to small
villages like Sam Neua) and engaged
in monitoring the observance of the
1954 Geneva agreement which
12
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ended the hostilities in Indochina.
The author regards the whole
experience as a positive one on a
personal level, although he is less
certain about what the mission
achieved. They investigated and
reported on many situations, but
rarely learned of the results of their
efforts because the Commission
was not accountable to them. Still,
de Domenico concludes that “while
I can find no hard proof, I have this
warm feeling that we did do some
good, as much as could have been
done in those troubled times.”
Canadian troops have been
involved in many other
peacekeeping operations over the
decades. Let’s hope we see more
memoirs like de Domenico’s which
can help put a human face on these
difficult but fascinating missions.
RK
* * * * *
Peter C. Rollins and John E.
O’Connor, eds., Hollywood’s World
War I: Motion Picture Images
(Bowling Green, OH: Bowling
Green State University Popular
Press, 1997), $19.95 US paper, 304
pages, ISBN 0-87972-756-X.
The current popularity of StevenSpielberg’s Saving Private
Ryan has turned the film-viewing
public’s attention back to the subject
of war, a trend that is likely to
continue with forthcoming remakes
of classics like “The Thin Red
Line.” As a result, this timely
collection of essays is likely to have
particular significance. It charts the
evolution of the Great War as a
subject for Hollywood, from the
initial avoidance of the theme to a
realization that the war could be a
source for great epic motion
pictures (like “The Big Parade” in
1925 or “What Price Glory?” in
1926) to an emphasis on the agony
and futility of war, with films like
“All Quiet on the Western Front” and
“Hell’s Angels,” both of which
appeared in 1930. As war loomed
again in the late 1930s, the Great
War again became an object lesson
in civic duty and the nobility of the
soldier in such classics as “The
Fighting 69th” (1940) and “Sergeant
York” (1941). Among the more
notable of the post-1945 offerings
were “Paths of Glory” (1957), “Oh,
What a Lovely War!” (1969), and,
most recently, the screen adaptation
of Pat Barker’s Regeneration.
Many of these films are treated
in some detail in individual essays;
other articles deal with the portrayal
of First World War veterans in
American film, the CBS series
“World War I,” produced in the
1960s, and a comparative
filmography of Great War motion
pictures through the decades.
Whether you are a student of war
and culture or simply a fan of the
war movies shown on History
Television, you will find much of
interest in this volume.
WS
* * * * *
Benjamin S. Parsons, Relieved of
Command (Manhattan, KS:
Sunflower University Press, 1997),
$20.95 US paper, 190 pages, ISBN
0-89745-204-6.
In this fascinating volume, Parsonsassembles the stories of a number
of American soldiers who were
linked by a common factor – they
were all combat-command general
officers who were relieved while
commanding brigades, divisions,
or corps. It is not an exhaustive
account of all individuals who
suffered this fate; rather, the author
has selected a number of cases
which he deems to be particularly
significant. And so we read of
Brigadier-General John J. Bohn,
head of Combat Command B of the
3rd Armoured Division in
Normandy, who was relieved in
July 1944 when he questioned (in
a louder voice than was necessary)
the use to which his tanks would
be put in an attack near St. Lo. For
his anger, Bohn was busted all the
way down to colonel. Another
interesting case involved Major-
General Eugene M. Landrum,
commander of the 90th Division
(known as the “Tough Ombres”),
who was sacked by Bradley because
his division had the poorest record
of any in VIII Corps in Normandy,
taking very heavy casualties for very
little gain. We also read of Major-
General Alan W. Jones, who was
made the scapegoat and fired when
his 106th Division was wiped out in
the Battle of the Bulge.
Parsons is also not shy about
making forthright conclusions. He
argues that a commander cannot
abide a subordinate who is too
greatly loved by his men, and has
little good to say about Omar
Bradley. His observations about
Bradley’s treatment of his
subordinates serves as a good
summary of the book’s thrust:
“Those commanders who have not
smelled cordite…are more likely
to be a sacker than those who have
been in battle…Omar Bradley, who
had never commanded a division
in combat, never commanded any
real fighting force in combat, was
the worst sacker of World War II.”
DR
* * * * *
Donald J. Young, First 24 Hours
of War in the Pacific
(Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street
Press,1998), $24.95 US, 178 pages,
ISBN 1-57249-079-9.
During the first day of the Pacificwar, Japanese military units
launched attacks over an area
covering nearly one-quarter of the
earth’s surface. Key targets
included Malaya, Hong Kong,
Guam, the Philippines, Wake and
Midway Islands. In those first 24
hours, Japan scored amazing
successes and, even in places like
Malaya and the Philippines, where
conquest took rather longer to
achieve, the seeds of that eventual
conquest were sown in the first day
of battle.
Young sets out to dissect that
fateful day by looking at each of
these attacks in turn. He also
examines the sinking of the Cynthia
Olsen, a lumber transport out of
Honolulu, by a Japanese
submarine, the loss of American
13
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and British river patrol boats on
the Yangtze at Shanghai, the capture
of US Navy and Marine
detachments in north China, the
sinking of four Japanese transports
by a Dutch submarine off the
Netherlands East Indies, and air
operations flown by pilots from the
American aircraft carrier USS
Enterprise. Young concludes with
the situation in Washington, DC,
when American politicians voted
almost unanimously (a Montana
representative who had also voted
against war in 1917 was the only
dissenter) to declare war.
The tone of the book is
workmanlike throughout; Young
sticks to a straightforward
narrative, clarifying the course of
events by emphasizing the time each
occurred. The maps and
photographs, though not of the best
quality, are certainly serviceable
enough. All in all, it is an interesting
blow-by-blow account of one day
that changed the course of the
Second World War.
WE
* * * * *
Herbert A. Werner, Iron Coffins: A
Personal Account of the German
U-Boat Battles of World War II
(New York: Da Capo, 1998 [1969]),
$20.95 paper, 329 pages, ISBN 0-
306-80842-0.
When the motion picture “DasBoot” was released, audiences
were struck by the degree to which
it seemed to capture the
experiences of German submarine
crews. Particularly effective was the
way the film captured the terrifying
claustrophobia as the boat tried to
outwit Allied sub-hunters. With this
re-issue of Werner’s memoirs,
readers can now experience that
feeling again. Werner served on U-
boats from 1941 until the end of
the war, rising in rank from ensign
to captain, so he is definitely a man
who knows of what he writes. He
was also among the minority of men
who survived service in the U-Boat
fleet (28,000 of the 39,000 men in
the force lost their lives during the
Second World War). So, Werner is
almost uniquely qualified to write
of the U-boat experience, and he
does not disappoint. The memoir
is fast-paced and grippingly written,
and the reader is carried along with
the crew’s rising panic as the boat
tries to evade the hundreds of depth
charges released by Allied corvettes
and destroyers lurking above it.
Indeed, readers will feel the same
sense of claustrophobia that became
overpowering when watching “Das
Boot.” Werner also describes the
mental state of U-boat crews, who,
as the war dragged on, came
increasingly to regard their
missions as suicidal; Werner
himself increasingly took refuge in
a world of fast living and alcohol
whenever he was on shore.
More than simply a great read,
Iron Coffins is also a fascinating
glimpse at the Battle of the Atlantic
from the other side of the
periscope; interesting in this regard
is how the crews coped with Allied
technological advances, including
the addition of escort carriers and
longer-range aircraft that tipped the
balance away from the
Kriegsmarine. For both the
historian and the general reader,
this book is hard to put down.
WE
* * * * *
Bert S. Hall, Weapons and
Warfare in Renaissance Europe
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1997), $29.95 US,
300 pages, ISBN 0-8018-5531-4.
At the centre of this book is asubstance that has become
inseparable from the conduct of
war: gunpowder. Invented by the
Chinese, perhaps as early as 800
AD, it came to Europe in the
thirteenth century and in time
became essential to the arsenal of
any king or prince. Still, in
opposition to the received version
of events, Hall argues that
gunpowder did not transform
European warfare overnight.
Tactics were already undergoing
fundamental changes when
gunpowder arrived on the scene, so
it acted more as an accelerant than
a catalyst for change. Furthermore,
Hall details the often overlooked
problems encountered by
Europeans as they tried to make
use of the new technology; perhaps
the most significant among these
was a lack of naturally occurring
saltpetre (one of the principal
ingredients of gunpowder) in
Europe, and the problems involved
with manufacturing firearms which
had reasonably predictable firing
characteristics. Thankfully, Hall
discusses both of these matters in
such a way that the novice is able to
follow the processes. For example,
his account of experiments done in
the eighteenth century to measure
deviations in the paths of musket
balls after firing is particularly
informative.
Weapons and Warfare in
Renaissance Europe was a finalist
for the 1997 Wallace K. Ferguson
Prize, awarded by the Canadian
Historical Association for the year’s
best book in a field other than
Canadian history. For a book so well
written, and so well researched
from a wide variety of sources, the
honour is richly deserved.
WS
* * * * *
Kent Fedorowich, Unfit for Heroes:
Reconstruction and Soldier
Settlement in the Empire
Between the Wars (Manchester:
Manchester University Press
[distributed by UBC Press], 1995),
$95,  243 pgs, ISBN 0-7190-4108-2.
With the current popularity ofJack Hodgins’ new novel
Broken Ground, which recounts
the experiences of a group of
soldier-settlers in British Columbia
in the 1920s, it is a good time to
return to the historical record and
understand the motivations which
lay behind the soldier-settlement
movement as it evolved through the
First World War and into the
interwar years. The author covers
the situation in South Africa,
Australia, and New Zealand, but
readers of Canadian Military
History will be most interested in
his discussion of the Canadian
14
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context. In many ways, he fleshes
out the conclusion which has
already been drawn by Desmond
Morton and others: that Canada’s
soldier settlement policy was a
disappointing failure. Fedorowich
maintains that this was not entirely
the government’s fault, and that high
wartime wheat prices led many non-
farmers to the false assumption that
farming was easy money; the
bureaucrats who drew up the plan
believed that, with commodity
prices as they were, the programme
was established on a firm and
prosperous footing. As the author
puts it, “the brave few who warned
that high prices were no substitute
for actual farming experience were
unfortunately ignored.”
If there is any cold comfort for
Canadians, it is that the scheme
worked no better in the other
dominions, and here we should be
grateful for Fedorowich’s
comparative approach. Ethnic
considerations in South Africa, an
immature federal system in
Australia, and a lack of good quality
crown land in New Zealand almost
foredoomed the soldier-settlement
schemes to failure. A decade after
the end of the war, of the 80,000
veterans who had been settled in
one of the dominion plans, fewer
than half remained on their land,
and many of the survivors were
hanging on by the skin of their
teeth. A sad end to a proud dream.
RK
* * * * *
Kenneth R. Ramsden, The
Canadian Kangaroos in World
War II: The Story of 1st Canadian
Armoured Carrier Regiment
(Cavan, ON: Ramsden-Cavan
Publishing Company (1701 Stewart
Drive, RR3 Cavan, ON, L0A 1C0,
1997), $16.95 (+$3 s&h), 203 pages,
ISBN 0-96996-97.
In the summer of 1944 the westernallies came ashore in Normandy.
After years of following a British
argued policy of attacking the
German Armed Forces on the
periphery Operation “Overlord”
brought the bulk of British,
American and Canadian ground
forces into direct combat with the
Wehrmacht. Casualty reports
immediately revealed that the front
line rifle regiments, the infantry,
were by far sustaining the heaviest
losses. As the Normandy campaign
progressed this pattern would grow
to alarming rates. The problem was
simple to understand but difficult
to address; how to attack well dug
in infantry positions defended by a
variety of support weapons such as
the mortar, artillery, machine gun
and anti-tank gun?
Terry Copp and Bill
McAndrew, in their ground
breaking study Battle Exhaustion,
detailed the peril faced by the
infantry soldier both physical and
mental. Utilizing Operational
Research reports they noted the
devastating effect mortars alone had
on attacking infantry, causing close
to 75 per cent of all physical
injuries. If the rifle regiments were
not to be bled dry some way had to
be found to increase their odds of
survival; enter the Kangaroo. As the
name suggests the Kangaroo served
as an armoured personnel carrier,
ferrying an infantry section across
open ground in relative safety from
small arms fire and shrapnel. The
first such vehicles put to this use
were surplus 105 mm Priest self-
propelled guns with the slightly
scandalous nickname of
“Unfrocked Priests.” They made
their debut on the night of 7 August
1944 in Operation “Totalize,”
fulfilling Lieutenant-General Guy
Simonds’ directive that “the infantry
shall be carried in bullet and
splinter proof vehicles to their
actual objectives” where they would
then “depouch” and begin their
attack. Later variants of the
Kangaroo would come from the
hundreds of surplus Canadian-built
Ram tanks sitting in England. With
their turrets removed Rams became
Kangaroos and the transformation
marked the beginning of greater
infantry-armour cooperation and a
significant drop in infantry
casualties on the offensive where the
armoured carriers were used.
Kenneth Ramsden, a former
member of the 1st Canadian
Armoured Carrier Regiment, has
written a history of this
revolutionary vehicle and the men
that employed them. The Canadian
Kangaroos in World War II follows
the creation of the first ad hoc unit
in the summer of 1944 to their final
“stand to” on the 20 June 1945.
Sprinkled throughout the
straightforward narrative are
several fascinating bits not the least
of which is his description of
Kangaroos being used to hold
portions of the front line, in
essence, going far beyond their
initial purpose of battlefield taxi.
This book was long overdue
and finally gives voice to an
innovative and vital component of
Commonwealth infantry operations
in the latter portion of the Second
World War.
CE
* * * * *
George Bradford, editor, AFV
News, RR 32, Cambridge, ON N3H
4R7.
Published three times a year foran annual subscription cost of
$15, this 24-page journal has been
around since 1965. As the title
suggests the content is specifically
oriented to armoured fighting
vehicles. The issues often carry a
very strong Canadian content. The
most recent issue (Sept-Dec 1998,
Vol.-33, No.3) features an article
detailing the service of the Centurion
tank in the Canadian army,
providing minute detail on many
aspects. Each issue also contains
many black and white photographs
along with line drawings and
technical data, often on very rare
vehicles, such as the Second World
War Canadian anti-aircraft tank, the
Skink.
Armoured vehicles have played
a role in virtually every conflict of
the 20th century. With AFV news the
reader gets a chance to delve a little
deeper into the rumbling world of
dust and diesel and find out just
what made a Tiger tick or a
Merkava unique.
CE
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